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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES-Holder in Due Course.--"Regularity."-The plaintiff took several notes which were drawn by the
defendant corporation by its treasurer who named himself therein as payee. Said treasurer indorsed the note to the plaintiff in
payment of a pre-existing personal obligation. Plaintiff as holder brought an action against the corporation as maker. Held, a
holder, who takes a note signed by a corporation by its treasurer in
payment of a personal obligation of the latter, cannot claim immunity
as an innocent holder, as the very form of the paper itself is sufficient to put him on his guard in view of Sections 52, 57, and 58 of the
Negotiable Instrument Law. That the instrument was "regular"
on its face cannot be predicated where the payee is in a trust or
quasi trust capacity to the maker. Gillman v. Bailey Carriage Co.
(Me. 1925) 131 Atl. 138. A bona fide holder of a promissory note
executed by an officer in the name of the corporation and payable to
the officer executing it, as an individual, in legal contemplation, cannot exist. Luden v. Lumber Co. (Ga.) 91 S. E. 102; L. R. A. 1917
C., 485.
W. L. T.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures.-The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, provides: "The right of the people to be .secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." United States v. Crosby, Federal
Case No. 14,893 holds that the Fourth Amendment quoted above
does not apply to state governments, but is a limitation exclusively
on the power of the Federal Government. However, most of the
State Constitutions in the United States embody this clause so that
this inhibition is applicable to state governments as well as to the
federal.
The question of unreasonable searches and seizures is thoroughly discussed by the recent case of Carroll, et al. v. U. S., decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1925. In that case two
Federal and one state prohibition officers were patrolling a high-
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way between Detroit and Grand Rapids. Having previously
learned that Carroll and Kiro, defendants, were "bootleggers",
they stopped Carroll's car and searched it, believing the car contained liquor. They found, under the upholstery, sixty-eight
quarts of bonded whiskey and gin. Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting liquor and assailed the conviction on the
ground that the trial court admitted in evidence, one quart of
whiskey and one of gin thus found, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The National Prohibition Act provides, in effect,
that it is unlawful to possess any liquor, and that a search-warrant may issue and the liquor destroyed. The act further provides that no warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling,
unless it is used for the unlawful sale of liquor, or unless it is in
part used for some business purpose. "Private dwellings" includes a room, or rooms, occupied not transiently, but solely as
residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. The Statute under which the seizure was made provides that when any
officer of the law finds any person transporting liquor in violation
of the law, in any vehicle, or water, or aircraft, it shall be the
duty of the officer to seize the liquor, take possession of the
vehicle, or craft, and arrest the person. It further provides that
the liquor shall then be destroyed; and, unless good cause be
shows, the property seized be auctioned and the proceeds paid
into the United States Treasury. An act of Congress, supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, provides that officers
searching any private dwelling, without warrant or maliciously and without warrant, search any other building or property,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine or imprisonment or both. Thus Congress left the officers, without
warrant, free to search automobiles, etc., without liability.
The question therefore presents itself in this form: Was the
search and seizure in this case consistent with the Fourth
Amendment? The court said that the above Amendment does
not denounce all searches and seizures, but merely unreasonable
ones. In Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 61, 6, the court held that an act
of Congress, authorizing the courts of the United States, in revenue cases, to require the defendant to produce private books
and papers, on penalty of having allegations made against him
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taken as confessed, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure even upon warrant.
The court said the true rule is: That if the search is made
without warrant, but upon probable cause, i. e., upon belief that
the car contains liquors, the search and seizure are valid.
Lytle v. U. S., 5 Fed..(2nd) 622, held that the search of an automobile by a prohibition agent was not unreasonable, where he
believed, on reasonable grounds, that it was being used for illegal transportation of liquor.
The court did nct go to the extent, however, of saying that
an officer can stop every car traveling the highways. The measure of legality is that the officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing the auto contains contraband liquor.
This, the court said, gives the owner, in absence of probable
cause, a right to have his car restored and the right to protection from the use of liquor as evidence against him and subjects
the officer to damages.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in his dissenting opinion said that
the character of "bootlegging" should not close our eyes to violation of conititutional rights following an attempt to destroy
it by unwarranted methods. U. S. v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, holds
that crimifial statutes should be construed strictly and in harmony
with the common law. The Volstead Act contains no grant of
authority to arrest upon suspicion and without warrant for the
first offense. 177 U. S. 529 is authority for the proposition that
an officer at common law is not authorized to make an arrest
without warrant for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his
presence. Justice McReynolds thought from the evidence in
this case that it was highly improbable that the officers in this
case had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendants were
transporting liquor. Mindful of the rule that criminal statutes
are to be construed strictly, he makes the point that the statute
in discussion provides that whenever officers shall discover any person in the act of transporting liquor, they shall seize the liquor and
arrest the person. The statute says nothing about suspicion. In
Miles v. State, 235 Pac. 260, the court held that the forcible search
of a person without warrant, on mere suspicion that he h-s liquor
in his possession is "unreasonable" and in violation of the Constitution. He admits that the Fourth Amendment denounces only un-
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reasonable seizures, but here he reasons since the seizure followed
an unlawful arrest, it therefore became unlawful. He cites Weeks
v. U. S., 58 Law Ed. 652, in which the defendant was arrested without warrant and his house searched and evidence therein found,
used against him on trial for violation of the statute against
the use of the mails for lotteries. The court held that immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures was denied the accused
and, his constitutional right violated.
When Congress intended that seizures and arrests might be
made on suspicion it has been careful to say so. The "Act to
Regulate Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage", March,
1789, "Act to provide more effectually for collection of duties
imposed by law on goods, wares, or merchandise imported into
the United States and tonnage of ships or vessels", August 4,
1790-These definitely empower officers to seize on suspicion and
radically differ from the Volstead Act.
Justice McReynolds holds that the search and seizure in this
case were unreasonable and therefore in violation of the defenWILLIAm R. BARR.
dant's constitutional rights.
DEDICATION.-Use of Land Dedicated for Special Purpose.-A tract of land was dedicated by the owner to the public
for use as a "landing" on the river. Upon this site the city
erected a city hall which burned down in 1923 while undergoing
repairs. The city proceeded to rebuild upon the property in
question whereupon, a suit by the state's attorney on the relation of four taxpayers, was instituted to enjoin the proposed reconstruction. Held, the owner, dedicating land may impose conditions on its use as he sees fit and the land cannot be applied to other
uses. The city therefore had no authority to appropriate the ground
so dedicated as a landing, and in the suit it was proper to grant an
injunction to prevent the city from erecting a: city hall thereon, without showing proof of special injury to the taxpayers. Streuber ex
rel. Hasket et al. v. City of Alton (Ill. 1925) 149 N. E. 577. A municipality has no right to construct a city hall and jail on land dedicated as a "plaza" by which the dedicator intended that the land be
used as a public square. Kelly v. Town of Hayward, (Calif.)219
Pac. 749. Where land is dedicated for a particular purpose it can
be used for that purpose only. McPike v. Ill. Ter. Ry. (Ill.) 137
N. E. 235. The effect of a dedication to a public use is not to de-

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

prive the owner of title, but he can afterward use the property for
any purpose not inconsistent with the use to which it was dedicated
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Greenfield, (Ga.) 128 S. E. 430. Where
land has been dedicated to a definite purpose by grant or devise, -it
cannot, without the consent of the grantor or devisor, or his successor in interest, be used for any other purpose. Mahoney v. Board
of Education, (Calif.) 107 Pac. 584; Kennard v. Eyermann (Mo.)
182 S. W. 737; Home Laundry Co. v Louisville, (Ky.) 182 S. W.
645. Nor has a city the right to change the use for which it was
dedicated for a more advantageous purpose, in the absence of an
assertion of the right of eminent domain.
Codntan v. Crocker,
(Mass.) 89 N. 3. 177; Poole v. Rehoboth (Del. Ch.) 80 Atl. 683.
W. L. T.
EQUITY.-Speific Performance of a Contract with Stipulation for LiquidAted Damages.-The following clause providing for liquidated damages was written into a contract for the
the sale of land, "It is further understood and agreed that each
of the parties makes this agreement only upon the express agreement and understanding that in the event of default of one party
in performing the terms of this contract the defaulting party shall
be bound to- pay unto the other party the sum of $2000, as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, to cover all damages for
said breach." The vendee brought a bill seeking to compel defendant, vendor, to specifically perform and the latter contended
that the clause made the contract expressly alternative and provided a bar to specific performance. Held, the mere presence of a
stipulation for liquidated damages for breach of a contract of this
nature does not make the contract an alternative one because the
primary object of this class of contracts is deemed to be performance,
and it is not to be presumed that stipulated damages for non-performance is intended to defeat that primary object, in the absence 6f
terms in the contract,.'or its relation to the subject mdtter, which
adequately disclose the contrary to have been the inteht of the contracting parties. Nolan v. Kirchner (N. J. Ch. 1925) 131 Atl. 104.
That a provision for a penalty or liquidated damages is no bar to
specific performance of affirmative contracts is generally conceded.
Ames Cas. Equity, Part 1, Ch. 2, P. 125 n. Nor is it a bar to an injunction. However, a few states consider the remedy at law ade-
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quate and decline to give relief. See Ames, supra. Thd better rule
is that in the principal case.
W. L. T.
INSURANCE-Not Regarded as Commerce.-Transacting
an insurance business is not engaging in "Commerce" within
any proper meaning of that term as used in the Constitution of
the United States.
Lunceford v. Commercial Travelers Mutual
Acc. Ass'n of America. (N. C.) 129 S. E. 805.
In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357, M!r. Justice
Fields, upholding a Virginia statute requiring foreign fire insurance companies to take out licenses before doing business in the
state, set forth the law as follows: "Issuing a policy of insurance
is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire entered into between
corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper
meaning of the word. They are not subjects of trade and barter
offered in the market as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one state to another, and
then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts
between parties which are completed by their signature and the
transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not interstate
transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different
states. They do not constitute a part of the commerce between
the states."
In Hooper v. People of State of California, 155 U. S. 648, 39
L. Ed. 297, Mr. Justice White asserts, that "the business of insurance
is not commerce. The contract of insurance is not an instrumentality of commerce. The making of such a contract is a mere incident of commercial intercourse, and in this respect there is no difference whatever between insurance against fire and insurance against
'the perils of the sea' ". And in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravzens,
178 U. S., 389, 20 Sup. Ct. 962, Justice McKenna, affirming this
holding, adds "or against the uncertainty of man's mortality."
CULLEN BROWN.

TRESPASS.&-Firing Shotgun Over Premises of Another.
-Plaintiff alleged that the defendant while hunting game stood
on the land of another and repeatedly discharged a shot gun at
fowl in flight over plaintiff's premises, "thereby preventing him
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from the quiet. undisturbed, peaceful enjoyment of his dwelling house, ranch, and property, to his damage of ten dollars."
Held, the defendant, by standing on adjacent land and firing a shot
gun over plaintiff's premises was guilty of trespass. Herrin v. Sutherland, (Mont. 1925) 241 Pac. 328. Calloway, C. J. quoting from
Sir Frederick Pollock's tenth edition of his work on "Torts", p.
363, said, "As regards shooting, it would be strange if we could object to shots being fired point blank across our land, only in the event
of an actual injury being caused." There has been much inconsistency among the English decisions, but in this country the courts
generally follow the definition given by Blackstone that land in its
legal signification has an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards. Before the day of airplanes the definition was accepted as a
sound maxim, but since commerce took to the air a serious doubt has
been cast upon the strict application of the maxim as a practical doctrine. No one would question the rule that where a person sets in
motion a body which falls on the land of another it is trespass, as
decided in a fairly recent case-Whittaker v. Stanzvick (Minn.)
111 N. W. 295. In the absence of a statute the common law rule
would prevail. An analogous situation as that presented irr
the
principal case seems to apply to the flight of airplanes through
the column of air above the land of another. Application of the common law rule might retard the progress of commercial aviation, so
it would seem that a duty rests upon the legislatures to solve.
the problem, Massachusetts took the initiative and passed a
a statute to remedy the situation several years ago. A. careful
survey of the proposition appears in 32 HARv. L. REv. 569, where it
is pointed out that three theories have been advanced to cope with
the perplexing question. One suggestion is that the air above
the land be construed as the property of the land owner subject
to a right of usage by the public similar to the right to pass
over navigable streams privately owned. Another idea advanced
would secure to the landowner the right of user,.but gives to
the aviator a right of passage without committing an actionable
wrong so long as he does not cause actual damage. The other
solution offered limits, "the scope of possible trespass by that of
effective possession," so that one traveling at such an altitude
that he would not disturb the space effectively possessed by the landowner cannot be deemed a trespasser.
W. L. T.

